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 Interdependence:
 An Alternative Conceptualization
 BART VICTOR
 University of Nebraska, Lincoln
 RICHARD S. BLACKBURN
 University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
 Conceptualizations of interdependence offered by Thompson (1967)
 and McCann and Ferry (1979) fail to satisfy basic requirements for
 empirical or practical investigations of complex organizations. An
 alternative conceptualization based on interdependence theory
 (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) is presented here
 and used to explain the causes of interunit conflict and the effective-
 ness of coordination strategy. Hypotheses are presented, and future
 research is proposed.
 Units within organizations remain to a greater
 or lesser degree interdependent as a necessary
 consequence of the division of labor. While the
 determinants of the division of labor have been
 extensively investigated, less attention has been
 paid to the consequences of that division. In
 particular, the effects of the interdependence be-
 tween work units have not been adequately in-
 vestigated (Jones, 1984; McCann & Galbraith,
 1981). It is argued here that expanding our knowl-
 edge of interdependence requires a more fully
 developed interdependence construct. This pa-
 per critiques the development and operational-
 ization of this construct and offers an alternative
 based on interdependence theory (Kelley &
 Thibaut, 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959).
 Lewin (1951) described constructs as tools used
 to solve problems. As a tool, the more devel-
 oped the construct, the more effective it can be
 in problem solving. Such development entails
 first defining the basic conceptual elements of
 constructs. By so defining constructs, related con-
 structs can be distinguished and instances of the
 same construct can be compared. In the case of
 interunit interdependence this construct should
 enable one to (a) compare the effects of different
 amounts of interdependence in organizations,
 and (b) distinguish between interdependence
 and other concomitant consequences of the divi-
 sion of labor. Neither of the constructs currently
 offered in the literature meet these minimum
 criteria.
 Current Interdependence Constructs
 Thompson's Construct
 Thompson (1967) identified three patterns of
 work flow that can exist between units, each rep-
 resenting a different intensity or degree of link-
 age between units.
 Pooled interdependence represents an ab-
 sence of work flow between units. Each unit uses
 independent inputs and makes independent con-
 tributions to the organization. Serial interdepend-
 ence represents a unidirectional exchange pat-
 tern where each unit's inputs are the outputs
 from another unit and similarly, each unit's out-
 puts are another unit's inputs. Reciprocal inter-
 dependence represents a contingent pattem in
 the work flow where each unit's inputs are its
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 own outputs, recycled through other units. Thomp-
 son conceptualized interdependence as the ex-
 tent to which the relationship between work units
 could be characterized by one of these types of
 interdependence.
 McCann and Ferry's Construct
 The second interdependence construct is based
 on an analysis of the transactions or exchanges
 between work units (McCann & Ferry, 1979).
 McCann and Ferry conceptualized interdepend-
 ence in terms of the characteristics of the re-
 sources exchanged between work units. They
 operationalized interdependence as an additive
 function of number of resources exchanged,
 amount of each resource, frequency of transac-
 tion, amount of time before loss of resource has
 an impact on the unit, and the value of the re-
 sources to the unit.
 Limitations of the Current Constructs
 Each of these approaches has been used in
 organization theory. (For reviews of the empiri-
 cal research on interdependence, see Fry, 1982,
 and McCann and Galbraith, 1981.) Nevertheless,
 it can be argued that neither construct meets
 Lewin's criteria. In particular, the constructs
 preclude an empirical assessment of differing
 amounts of interdependence.
 For instance, while Thompson's construct sug-
 gests an operationalization of interdependence,
 it is at best an ordinal scale. Thompson proposed
 that the amount of interdependence in a pooled
 process is less than the amount of interdepen-
 dence in a serial process. Further, both pooled
 and serial processes signify less interdependence
 than a reciprocal process, but how much more
 or less interdependence characterizes the differ-
 ences between the processes is not specified.
 McCann and Galbraith (1981) challenged the util-
 ity of Thompson's construct by asking, "are three
 pooled interdependencies greater or less than
 one reciprocal interdependency?" (p. 64). This
 ambiguity in Thompson's development limits the
 effectiveness of his construct as a tool for solving
 problems in organizations.
 While McCann and Ferry (1979) specified a
 less ambiguous metric in their work, they used
 only work flow exchange to develop their con-
 struct. They did not incorporate reciprocal inter-
 dependence into their metric of interdependence.
 For example, in addition to depending on a pur-
 chasing unit for raw materials, a production unit
 also may need materials delivered at specific
 times during production. A failure to coordinate
 shipping and receiving schedules might be as
 serious a problem for the production unit as a
 failure to deliver the materials at all. However,
 McCann and Ferry do not explicitly include a
 measure of such interdependence based on con-
 tingent or reciprocal requirements. As a re-
 sult, their construct cannot accurately represent
 amounts of interdependence.
 An Alternative Construct
 Interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut,
 1978; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) provides an alter-
 native framework for conceptualizing interde-
 pendence. Constructs developed from this frame-
 work can differentiate explicitly between levels
 of interdependence. Further, such constructs can
 permit precise distinctions between amounts of
 interdependence and other concomitant conse-
 quences of the division of labor. With constructs
 so derived, critical characteristics of the relations
 between work units can be compared and con-
 trasted.
 Interdependence Theory
 Interdependence theory has provided one of
 the major theoretical frameworks for social psy-
 chology since its original formulation in 1959
 (Allport, 1985). Since that time, interdependence
 theory has been applied to the study of a wide
 range of dyadic and intergroup phenomena in-
 cluding bargaining behavior (e.g., Kelley &
 Stahelski, 1970; Pruitt, 1970), conflict resolution
 (e.g., Deutsch, 1973), and the evolution of inter-
 group relationships (e. g., Insko et al., 1980, 1982).
 Applying interdependence theory to the study of
 organizational process was suggested by Weick
 (1979).
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 Interdependence theory proposes that the rela-
 tionship between one work unit and another
 work unit(s) can be described in terms of three
 requirements for action: requirements for one's
 own actions, requirements for the actions of
 others, cind requirements for joint action as dic-
 tated by the technological, environmental, or-
 ganizational, and interpersonal determinants of
 work flow specified by the division and assign-
 ment of labor. From these types of requirements
 for action, a construct of interunit interdepen-
 dence can be developed.
 Framework for the Construct
 The three requirements give interdependent
 units a specified degree of absolute and/or con-
 tingent control over their own and each other's
 performance. To the extent that Unit A requires
 an action by Unit B (e.g., delivery of materials,
 completion of a task), B can affect A's operations
 by either performing the required action or not.
 In this situation of simple exchange, interdepen-
 dence theory asserts that B has fate control (FC)
 over A.
 If A requires an action by B, contingent on A's
 own action (e.g., delivery of materials accord-
 ing to a production schedule, synchronized joint
 use of a machine), B again can affect A's perfor-
 mance by matching or not matching A's contin-
 gent response. Interdependence theory asserts
 thcat B has behavior control (BC) over A, because
 when B varies a behavior (action), it becomes
 preferable for A to vary a behavior.
 Finally, to the extent that A can influence its
 own performance by taking a particular action
 (e.g., completing a task, stocking materials), it is
 described as having reflexive control (RC). From
 an interdependence theory perspective, any
 interunit relationship can be described in terms
 of A's fate and behavior control over B, B's fate
 and behavior control over A, and each unit's
 own reflexive control.
 Like McCann and Ferry's (1979) approach, the
 unit of analysis is the work unit, represented by
 a manager and subordinates. The assumption is
 made that the outcomes of the work unit can be
 represented as outcome levels assessed by a
 manager. Such outcome levels are an opera-
 tionalization of the complex factors affecting the
 subjective utility of any alternative. Factors such
 as goals (Bowen & Jones, 1986), exchange and
 coordination costs (Williamson, 1975), and politi-
 cal, strategic, and personal motivations (Jones,
 1984; McClintock, 1972) may be incorporated in
 an assessment. How closely these outcomes cor-
 respond to the objective utility of such alterna-
 tives (Ford, 1979; Fry, 1982) remains an empiri-
 cal question.
 The work flow requirements of interdependent
 units can be represented through an interde-
 pendence matrix (see Figure 1). Each manager
 (A, B) has two possible actions (a 1, a2, b 1, b2)
 that would affect the performance of Unit A and
 the performance of Unit B. Although this theory
 permits explicit consideration of coalitions and
 other characteristics of multiple group behavior
 (e.g., Insko et al., 1982), only dyadic relation-
 ships are described here. Interdependence the-
 ory proposes that most of the fundamental pro-
 cesses of interdependence do not change as the
 number of interdependent parties or discrete ac-
 tions are increased. Thus, the basic character-
 istics of interdependence can be represented in
 a relationship between two persons, each having
 two alternaTtives.
 In Figure 1, the rows and columns of the ma-
 trix correspond to the actions of two units, A and
 -A-
 Al A2
 AlblI A2bl
 3
 BI
 -3
 -B- Blal Bla2
 Alb2 A2b2
 B2
 Fi al B2a2
 Figure 1.- Example matrix.
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 B. The manager of A has two alternative actions,
 al or a2. The manager of B also has two alterna-
 tive actions, bl or b2. The matrix is divided into
 four cells, each representing one of the four pos-
 sible action pairs (i.e., Al/Bl, Al/B2, A2/Bl,
 A2/B2). Each individual cell in the matrix is di-
 vided in half. Manager A's outcomes from a giv-
 en pair of actions are represented in the top half
 of each cell, and Manager B's outcomes are re-
 presented in the bottom half of each cell. Man-
 ager A's outcomes from the pair of actions Al/Bl
 is represented in the area Albl. Manager B's
 outcomes from the same pair of actions, Al/Bl,
 is represented in the area Blal.
 The numbers entered in the matrix represent
 each manager's anticipated outcomes from each
 action pair. The magnitude of each number re-
 presents the relative outcome level (comparison
 level) for a given pair of actions, while the sign
 indicates the direction of the outcome. In Figure
 1, Manager A's positive outcomes of 3 from the
 pair of actions Al/B 1 is entered in the area A lb 1,
 while Manager B's negative outcomes of 3 from
 the same pair of actions is entered in B la 1.
 An Example of Interdependence Theory
 A practical example is useful at this point. Con-
 sider the possible outcomes for a credit manager
 and a sales manager from each other's actions
 relative to an order from a new customer. The
 actions of the sales manager (Manager A) could
 be to approve (action a 1) or disapprove (action
 a2) the order. The credit manager (Manager B)
 also either could approve (action b 1) or disap-
 prove (action b2) the order. If the new customer
 represents an unknown credit risk, an interde-
 pendence matrix can be used to graphically re-
 present each manager's outcomes from his or her
 own actions and the actions of the other man-
 ager. If the sales manager is rewarded based on
 sales volume, he or she would prefer that the
 credit manager approve the order. The matrix in
 Figure 2 describes A as getting a positive out-
 come of 5 for B choosing action b 1. This value
 appears in areas Albl and A2bl, because the
 outcome is not a condition of what the sales
 manager does. From an interdependence theory
 perspective, A's outcomes from an action by B
 gives B fate control over A. Manager A's fate is
 controlled by whatever choice B makes.
 If the credit manager wishes to keep bad debts
 to a minimum, a negative outcome of, say, 4 could
 result from approving the order (action b 1) re-
 gardless of what the sales manager does. The
 matrix in Figure 2 portrays the credit manager
 as unconditionally receiving a -4 in areas Blal
 and Bla2. This gives B reflexive control, since B
 can provide positive outcomes by choosing B 1 or
 can deny these outcomes by choosing B2. That
 is, by his/her own action or reflex, B controls
 his/her own outcomes.
 As a third alternative, the credit manager
 might receive positive outcomes from coordinat-
 ing actions with the sales manager. For instance,
 the credit manager might have assessed a posi-
 tive outcome of 2 for approving orders which the
 sales manager approves and for disapproving
 orders that the sales manager disapproves. The
 outcomes from similar actions is represented by
 2 entered in areas Blal and B2a2 in Figure 3.
 In this case, the outcomes received by the credit
 manager are contingent upon, but not deter-
 mined by the actions of the sales manager. If the
 -A-
 Sales Manager
 Al A2
 approve disapprove
 B1 Albl A2bl
 i Blal \ Bla2 \
 -B-
 Figure 2. Example of fate and reflexive control.
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 sales manager approves the sales, in order to
 get positive outcomes the credit manager also
 must approve and vice versa. The contingent
 relationship between actions and outcomes re-
 presents the reciprocal nature of coordination re-
 quirements described by Thompson (1967). With-
 in the interdependence theory framework, the
 contingent or reciprocal dependence of B's out-
 comes on the pair's joint action gives A behavior
 control Qver B. That is, since A chooses al, this
 makes bl preferable to B; by choosing a2, A
 makes b2 preferable to B.
 A final or resultant matrix can be developed
 that represents all outcomes received by each
 manager from each pair of possible actions (see
 Figure 4). The resultant matrix contains the sumn
 of all matrices that contain a particular type of
 outcome (i.e., outcomes from one's own, other's,
 and jQint actions) for each manager. Assuming
 a manager will seek to maximize possible out-
 comes, his/her chQice of action can be inferred
 from this matrix.
 An Alternative Interdependence Construct
 Within this theoretical framework, the amount
 of interunit interdependence is defined as the
 extent to which a unit's outcomes are controlled
 directly by or are contingent upon the actions of
 another unit. The degree of interdependence be-
 tween any two units can be described by an
 index calculated from the components of the
 matrix. The index of dependence (ID) is calcu-
 lated as the sum of the squares of a unit's out-
 comes controlled by another unit's actions (FC),
 and those outcomes contingent on the actions of
 another unit (BC); divided by the sum of the
 squares of all of a unit's outcomes (RC, BC, and
 FC). The formula for the index of dependence for
 Unit A is presented in Figure 5. As the amount of
 fate and behavior control increases, relative to
 the amount of reflexive control, the index in-
 creases from zero (completely independent) to
 1.0 (completely dependent).
 In the above example the index of dependence
 for the sales manager (A) is 1.0, indicating that
 his or her actions are completely dependent on
 those of the credit manager. In the example,
 she/he was described as subject only to fate con-
 trol by the credit manager. The index is . 33 (mod-
 erately independent) for the credit manager (B).
 In the example, the credit manager is described
 as having strong reflexive control and being sub-
 ject to relatively weaker behavior control by the
 sales manager.
 This construction of interdependence can be
 used to represent Thompson's typology. The lack
 of interaction between units in pooled interde-
 pendence can be represented as a matrix in
 -A-
 Sales Manager
 Al A2
 approve disapprove
 B1 Albi A2bl
 0 ~~0 0
 r
 0
 20
 d
 i Blal Bla2
 B- tAlb2 2b2
 D. ~0 0
 r. 2
 B2 3.E aml o1 B2a2
 Figure 3. Example of behavior control.
 -A-
 Sales Manager
 Al A2
 approve disapprove
 Bi Albl A2bl
 rCB
 d
 i Blal \ Bla2 \
 -B- tAlb2 A2b2
 (D
 B2 B2al B2a2
 Figure 4. Example of resultant matrix.
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 which both units only have reflexive control. By
 adding fate controls to that matrix, the direct and
 noncontingent effects of unit action which distin-
 guish serial interdependence can be repre-
 sented. Finally, by adding behavior control, the
 contingent effects which distinguish reciprocal
 interdependence can be represented. Interde-
 pendence theory can readily capture the "Gutt-
 man scale" quality of Thompson's typology. It
 also offers an explicit metric for comparing lev-
 els of interdependence, which Thompson's typol-
 ogy lacks.
 The elements used by McCann and Ferry can
 be incorporated as factors contributing to the
 magnitude of the utility of a given action. Fre-
 quency, amount, and criticality of resources ex-
 changed are arguably central determinants of
 the importance of an action. Thus interdepen-
 dence theory allows incorporation of the ideas of
 Thompson and McCann and Ferry without their
 limitations.
 It has been demonstrated then that interde-
 pendence theory can describe different amounts
 of interunit interdependence. In so doing, the
 construct satisfies Lewin's first requirement. It
 must, however, be demonstrated that the pro-
 posed interdependence construct can satisfy
 Lewin's second requirement, that it can be differ-
 entiated from related constructs. One such re-
 lated construct is interunit conflict. When labor
 is divided, the structure of the consequent rela-
 tions between units creates some potential for
 interunit conflict (Jones, 1984; Lawrence & Lorsch,
 1967; Thompson, 1967).
 (FCa2 + BCa2)
 A's Dependence =
 (RCa2 + BCa2 + FCa2)
 Where:
 RCa = A's reflexive control
 BCa = Behavior control over A
 FCa = Fate control over A
 Figure, 5. Formula for index of dependence.
 Applying the New Construct
 Determinants of Interunit Conflict
 Consider the credit and sales managers re-
 viewing two orders-one from a reliable cus-
 tomer, the other from a questionable customer.
 In the case of the customer of questionable
 repute, the sales manager wants to approve the
 order, but the credit manager wants to disap-
 prove it. The sales manager wants the credit
 manager to approve the order, and the credit
 manager wants the sales manager to disapprove
 it. The interdependence between the two man-
 agers is represented as mcatrix X in Figure 6. In
 matrix X both the sales manager (A) and the
 credit manager (B) are subject to fate control (3)
 and have reflexive control (6). In this case, the
 fate control and reflexive control are noncorre-
 spondent. Each manager prefers that the other
 choose his or her own least preferred option. In
 this situation, there is a conflict between what
 each manager wants to do and what the other
 wishes him or her to do.
 In the case of the reliable customer, both the
 credit and sales manager want to approve the
 order, and both would prefer that the other man-
 ager approve the order as well. The situation
 can be represented by matrix Y in Figure 6. As
 in matrix X, both Managers A and B also are
 subject to fate control (3) and have reflexive con-
 trol (6). However, in this case, the fate control
 and reflexive control are correspondent. Each
 manager prefers to do what the other wants the
 manager to do. Thus, in this situation there is no
 conflict between the twQ managers, where there
 was such conflict in the first case.
 It is at this point that the inadequacy of the
 current constructs becomes most apparent. Lewin
 (1951, p. 37) stated that related constructs should
 be derivable from distinct functions of common
 elements. Only constructs so derivedl can be cdis-
 tinguished precisely from one another and their
 effects compared. Both Thompson's, and Mc-
 Cann and Ferry's constructs fail to meet this
 requirement. Neither the pattern of work flow
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 nor the volume of transactions can be used to
 specify the amount of interunit conflict. Both
 Thompson and McCann and Ferry assumed that
 "the probability of conflict among positions or
 groups is directly proportional to their degree
 of interdependence" (Thompson, 1967, p. 60).
 While interdependence is a necessary condition
 for conflict to occur, the above example demon-
 strates that interdependence is not a sufficient
 condition.
 With the new construct, the level of interunit
 conflict created by the division of labor can be
 determined from the pattern of outcomes repre-
 sented in the matrix. The difference of interest
 between two parties can be measured by the
 index of correspondence developed by Kelley
 and Thibaut (1978). The index distinguishes be-
 tween relationships in which the differences be-
 tween units' outcomes are great (high conflict of
 interest) and relationships in which the sums of
 the outcomes for both units is great (high com-
 monality of interest). The index of correspondence
 (IC) can be calculated for each matrix using the
 formula presented in Figure 7. Matrices become
 increasingly noncorrespondent as the index
 value moves from 0 to -1, and increasingly corre-
 spondent as the index moves from 0 to + 1.
 Using the above formula, the index of corre-
 spondence for matrix X is -.8, and for matrix Y it
 is + .8. In matrix X, the outcomes for the two man-
 agers are highly noncorrespondent, and conflict
 is likely, while in matrix Y the outcomes for the
 two managers are highly correspondent and
 such conflict is unlikely.
 The elements used in calculating the index of
 correspondence are the ones used in calculat-
 ing the index of dependence. Thus, the proposed
 constructs can be used to distinguish between
 the amount of interdependence and the amount
 of conflict between units as Lewin prescribed.
 Interdependence theory offers a basis for re-
 conceptualizing and operationalizing interunit in-
 terdependence in a way that satisfies both of
 Lewin's conditions: (a) The constructs can be used
 to compare instances of interdependence across
 settings, and (b) the related constructs of interde-
 pendence and conflict can be derived from com-
 mon conceptual elements.
 A final requirement of such conceptualizations,
 imposed by an applied discipline like organiza-
 tion theory, is that constructs are demonstrably
 useful in framing and investigating questions,
 "the answers to which matter" (J. S. Adams, per-
 sonal communication, 1982). In recognition of this
 -A- -A-
 Sales Manager Sales Manager
 Al A2 Al A2
 approve disapprove approve disapprove
 BI Albl Abl B Albl A2b
 C ~~~3 -3 Q9 3
 e 0
 B 1 3 3 d 6 e
 i !Bla B1a2 i Bi1C Bl12
 t Alb2 A2b2 -B- t Alb2 2
 6 0 6 0
 r< -3 0 r. 3 0
 B2 B2 l B2a B2 B2al B2a2
 Matrix X Matrix Y
 Figure 6. Examples (respectively) of noncorrespondence (matrix X) and correspondence (matrix Y).
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 requirement, the constructs derived above are
 applied here to a question posed by Thompson
 (1967, p. 57): What determines the effectiveness
 of particular coordination strategies?
 Determinants of Effective Coordination
 Strategies
 Organizations employ a variety of coordina-
 tion or integration strategies to manage relations
 between units (e.g., rules, plans, lateral relations,
 bargaining, rewards, and job designs). McCann
 and Galbraith (1981) suggested that coordina-
 tion strategies vary along three dimensions:
 formality, cooperativeness, and localization.
 Informal, decentralized, and cooperative strate-
 gies can be characterized as lateral or organic,
 while formal, centralized, and controlling strat-
 egies can be characterized as vertical or mecha-
 nistic (Burns & Stalker, 1961).
 Interdependence and Coordination. Thomp-
 son (1967) proposed that pooled, serial, and re-
 ciprocal interdependence would be increasingly
 difficult to coordinate. He argued that a preferred
 mode of coordination should be associated with
 each type of interdependence. Using the termi-
 nology of McCann and Galbraith (1981) Thomp-
 son predicted that under norms of rationality,
 increasing interdependence should be coordi-
 nated by increasingly informal, localized, and
 cooperative strategies.
 Thompson described increasing amounts of in-
 terdependence as posing increasing degrees of
 contingency to interdependent units. Such con-
 tingency represents increasing ambiguity and
 uncertainty in the coordination process (Jones,
 1984). The degree of contingency posed by inter-
 dependence is described as affecting the fre-
 quency and volume of communication and deci-
 sion making between units.
 With pooled interdependence, action can proceed
 without regard to action in other positions ....
 With sequential interdependence, however, each
 position in the set must be readjusted if any one of
 them acts improperly .... With reciprocal inter-
 dependence . . . the actions of each position in
 the set must be adjusted to the actions of one or
 more others in the set (Thompson, 1967, p. 58).
 In response to the sheer volume of coordination
 requirements, Thompson recommended increas-
 ingly lateral, organic coordination strategies. As
 the amount of interdependence increases, "or-
 ganizations seek to localize interaction and con-
 fine it to conditionally autonomous groups-to
 cluster positions and groups into the smallest pos-
 sible inclusive units in order to minimize coordi-
 nation costs" (Thompson, 1967, p. 60).
 In general, empirical research supports Thomp-
 son's propositions. For example, the Aston stud-
 ies indicated that work flow interdependence was
 positively related to the localization of authority
 and negatively related to the degree of formal-
 ization (Aldrich, 1972; Child, 1973, HIickson, Pugh,
 & Pheysey, 1969). In contrast, Mohr (1971) found
 no relationship between interdependence and
 participativeness of supervision. Hrebiniak (1974),
 using Mohr's measure, found a significant posi-
 tive relationship between interdependence and
 2 (RCa * FCb + RCb * FCa + BCb * BCa)
 Correspondence
 (RCa2 + RCb2 + FCa2 + FCb2 + BCa 2 + BCb2)
 Where:
 RCa = A's reflexive control
 BCa = Behavior control over A
 FCa = Fate control over A
 RCb = B's reflexive control
 BCb = Behavior control over B
 FCb = Fate control over B
 Figure 7. Computational formula for index of correspondence.
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 participativeness in decision making, and signifi-
 cant negative relationships between interde-
 pendence and both the use of rules and the close-
 ness of supervision. Lynch (1974) also found that
 interdependence was positively related to the
 number of rules used in a unit.
 Van de Ven, Delbecq, and Koenig (1976) found
 that amount of interdependence was positively
 associated with the use of lateral coordination
 strategies such as horizontal communication
 channels and unscheduled meetings. Amount
 of interdependence was found to be negatively
 related to the use of vertical coordination strate-
 gies such as rules, plans, and vertical communi-
 cation channels.
 Consistent with Thompson then, it is hypothe-
 sized that:
 Hypothesis 1: Increases in the amount of interde-
 pendence created by the division
 of labor should be associated with
 the selection and effectiveness of
 increasingly lateral, organic coor-
 dination strategies.
 Conflict and Coordination. The amount of inter-
 unit conflict also has been proposed as a deter-
 minate of the effectiveness of a coordination strat-
 egy. Organizations may use rules and guide-
 lines to manage low levels of interunit conflict.
 According to March and Simon (1958), manag-
 ers faced with interunit conflict prefer unilateral
 (e.g., rules, programs) rather than multilateral
 techniques (e.g., bargaining or confrontation) to
 resolve the conflict. As the amount of conflipt
 increases, managers need to use mediated con-
 frontation to help resolve disagreements between
 units (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Nielson, 1972).
 At high levels of interunit conflict, organizations
 need to use even more assertive hierarchical or
 forcing methods to manage the relations between
 units. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) noted that in
 the face of pure conflict "the usefulness of open-
 ness and confrontation is probably severely
 limited" (p. 205).
 These propositions are consistent with the find-
 ings and theory on bargaining in organizations.
 In laboratory studies of bargaining dyads, in-
 creasing degrees of conflict have been associ-
 ated with an increased preference for third party
 intervention (Rubin, 1980). This association may
 be due to interdependent parties recognizing
 that, in the face of increasing conflict of interest,
 they may not be able to settle their differences
 on their own (Rubin, 1980). Thus, increasing
 amounts of interdependence may be associated
 with increasingly lateral or organic strategies.
 Increasing amounts of conflict may require quite
 distinct responses. Therefore, it is further speci-
 fied that:
 Hypothesis 2: Increases in the noncorrespondence
 of outcomes created by the division
 of labor will be associated with the
 selection and effectiveness of in-
 creasingly vertical or mechanistic
 coordination strategies.
 The joint effects of the division of labor on coor-
 dination strategy predicted in Hypotheses 1 and
 2 are displayed in Figure 8. In contrast with the
 traditional unidimensional continuum used to de-
 scribe the distinction between mechanistic and
 organic strategies, the dimensions are conceptu-
 alized as independent variables which together
 describe particular types of coordination strat-
 egies. In Figure 8, along the X axis is a contin-
 uum representing a progression from low levels
 to high levels of contingency management strat-
 egies. Along this continuum, Thompson's predic-
 tions fall. When the amount of interdependence
 is low, there is little contingency to be coordi-
 nated between units. Therefore, a minimal strat-
 egy is appropriate, such as "devising rules which
 apply to certain processes or categories of activ-
 ity whenever and wherever these occur in the
 organization" (Thompson, 1967, p. 61). As the
 amount of interdependence increases, the amount
 of contingency to be managed increases. This
 culminates in the constant mutual adjustment
 between what Van de Ven, Delbecq, and Koenig
 (1976) called teams.
 Along the Y axis is a continuum representing
 a progression from low to high levels of conflict
 management strategies. Along this axis, the pre-
 dicted responses to noncorrespondence of out-
 comes fall. As the amount of noncorrespondence
 increases, conflict resolution requirements in-
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 crease. To resolve increasing amounts of conflict,
 more and more formalization, centralization, and
 control are needed. This continuum culminates
 in centralized, hierarchical coordinating strat-
 egies. Therefore, the optimal coordination strat-
 egy is described as an admixture of both contin-
 gency and conflict management elements, each
 in response to a concomitant characteristic of
 the division of labor.
 The model in Figure 8 permits predictions re-
 garding the selection and effectiveness of hybrid
 coordination strategies such as the matrix struc-
 ture (Davis & Lawrence, 1977; Galbraith, 1973).
 Davis and Lawrence (1977) described the matrix
 as organic structures such as teams overlaid onto
 a mechanistic structure. They predicted that the
 matrix would be most effective when both re-
 quirements for contingency management are
 high and when the requirements for conflict reso-
 lution are high (due to the need to maintain a
 dual focus and to distribute scarce resources).
 Implications
 By employing the structural framework of in-
 terdependence theory, future studies can define
 more explicitly the possible determinants of the
 effectiveness of coordination strategy. However,
 one critical problem to be resolved is estimating
 the structural components of interdependence in
 the field. Although researchers of bargaining and
 other game theoretic applications of interdepend-
 ence theory have manipulated component utili-
 ties in the laboratory, little field estimation of such
 utilities has been done.
 One of the critical measurement issues is
 whether to estimate the constructs directly or to
 estimate the components first, and then calcu-
 late the indices. In studies of personal relation-
 ships, researchers have explored both strategies.
 For example, Walster, Walster, and Traupman
 (1978) calculated a net profit or correspondence
 of interdependence from self-reports of hetero-
 High
 C) Chain of
 1) | : Command Matrix
 o.w
 CD)
 Low High
 Contingency Management Strategy
 Amount of Interdependence
 Figure 8. Model of coordination strategy selection and effectiveness.
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 sexual dyads. In a series of investigations of the
 structure of personal relationships, Kelley (1979)
 collected self-reports of component values from
 dyads in which a specific decision was made
 (e.g., choosing a movie to attend, cleaning an
 apartment).
 While the studies of personal relationships
 have yielded useful data from field settings, an
 organizational setting has yielded mixed results.
 In a study of power and conflict between automo-
 bile dealers and distributors, Anderson and
 Narus (1984) constructed interdependence matri-
 ces representing major marketing decisions from
 self-reports of component values; serious reliabil-
 ity and validity problems with their data were
 reported. To date, there are no examples of stud-
 ies that directly measure the construct indices in
 organizations.
 Much of the challenge to successfully apply-
 ing interdependence theory in organizations lies
 in measurement issues, yet objective sources of
 data on component utilities, and reliable and
 valid methods of component estimation from self-
 reports need to be developed. Nevertheless, con-
 structs derived from interdependence theory do
 not pose very different measurement problems
 than other constructs, while they do offer distinct
 theoretical advantages.
 Further Advantages
 The advantages of this application of interde-
 pendence theory extend beyond its facility for
 analyzing the concomitant effects of interdepend-
 ence and interunit conflict. This framework also
 can be applied to investigating other conse-
 quences of the division of labor. For example,
 the relative power between units in terms of mag-
 nitudes and asymmetries of dependence can be
 calculated from the matrix structure, and the prop-
 ositions of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer
 & Salancik, 1978) can be modeled. In general,
 resource dependence theory proposes that coali-
 tions (e.g., work units) attempt to change their
 relationship with the environment by either de-
 creasing their dependence on others or increas-
 ing others' dependence on them (Ulrich & Bar-
 ney, 1984). Both of these objectives can be mod-
 eled as changes in either the magnitude or sym-
 metry of interdependence (again employing the
 basic conceptual elements described above).
 Further, structural bases of power can be iso-
 lated to distinguish between exchange depen-
 dence (relative dependence on others' actions)
 and coordination dependence (relative depen-
 dence on joint actions). Thus, beyond the spe-
 cific advantages of a more robust interdepend-
 ence construct, the major implication of the
 argument presented here is the utility of interde-
 pendence theory as a framework for studying
 organizations.
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